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SENTIMENT AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE FORMULATION AND REALIZATION OF THE 
BALFOUR DECLARATION 
by 
Janko M. Šćepanović 
Advisor: Professor Simon Davis 
The 1917 Balfour Declaration remains perhaps one of the furthest reaching British policy 
statements. It laid foundation for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and 
was ever since perceived by some as the source of the subsequent Arab-Jewish conflict in 
Palestine. The Declaration was also interpreted in certain circles as a desperate wartime measure 
of the British government which hoped to turn the tide of the costly war against Germany by 
making promises to supposedly influential worldwide Jewish community. However, the Balfour 
Declaration was more than that. It was a continuation of parallel British geostrategic and 
humanitarian sensibilities dating back to the Foreign Secretary Viscount Palmerston, and which 
influenced the attitudes and policies of later British leaders like the Foreign Secretary Arthur J. 
Balfour and the Prime Minister David Lloyd George.  Much of the geopolitical drive behind the 
Declaration could be traced back to long established British interest in the security of the Suez 
Canal and communication with India. Humanitarianism, on the other hand, involved a genuine 
concern for the future of European Jewry, sometimes leavened by messianic Protestantism. 
Palmerston, Balfour and Lloyd George believed they could successfully merge humanitarian 
philo-semitism with pragmatic geopolitics securing a better future for an oppressed people and 
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The 1917 Balfour Declaration remains perhaps one of Britain’s furthest reaching policy 
statements. It contained a promise of British support for the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine. Its eventual incorporation into the 1922 mandate for Palestine transformed 
what was to some an abstraction of political sentiment into a real obligation under British and 
international law. Historians have debated it ever since. Leonard Stein identified various factors 
leading to it. One was the sympathy for Zionism shown by the Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George and the Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour. Another important factor was a desire 
to extricate Palestine from Britain’s 1916 agreement with France (the famous Sykes-Picot 
agreement). No less significant was the fear that Germany was about to make similar offer to the 
Zionists, and a belief that a large-scale Jewish settlement could stabilize the whole region 
beneficially for the British empire.
1
 Stein believed the timing of the Declaration was primarily 
related to a perception by the British cabinet that a favorable pro-Zionist statement would 
positively influence Russian and American Jews, who would in return help Britain by keeping 
their governments in the war against Germany.
2
 Subsequently, Isaiah Friedman wrote how the 
Balfour Declaration was an attempt to secure vital wartime gains in the Middle East through an 
endorsement of the principle of self-determination, so avoiding American criticism of overt 
imperialism.
3
 Jonathan Schneer drew a similar link between reported German propaganda and 
the urgency on part of the British Cabinet to issue the Balfour Declaration in the fall of 1917.
4
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Nevertheless, Schneer wrote how even after the Declaration was adopted by the Cabinet, there 
was no immediate guarantee that Britain would fulfill its pledge. In November 1917 secret talks 
were held in Switzerland between British and Ottoman officials about a possible separate peace 
treaty, and Alfred Milner, the Secretary of State for War, considered leaving Palestine under 
nominal Turkish suzerainty.
5
 From these and other studies, it is evident that Britain’s perception 
of the value of supporting Zionism is multi-faceted. One needs also to consider British interest in 
the fate of the Jews, which even in the nineteenth century had a humanitarian dimension. In this 
vein, Leopold Amery, an Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet
6
 who was involved in moving 
Lloyd George’s Eastern policy,
7
 observed how: “England was the only country where the desire 
of the Jews to return to their ancient homeland had always been regarded as a natural aspiration 




The Balfour Declaration should not be regarded as just a short-term reaction to the events 
of the First World War. Rather, it was a continuation of parallel British geostrategic and 
humanitarian sensibilities dating back to Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple, Third Viscount 
Palmerston. Much of the drive behind the Declaration could be traced back to long established 
British interest in Palestine and the Jews. This paper will attempt to demonstrate how from 1840s 
to Lloyd George’s prime-ministership, a combination of geopolitics and humanitarianism drew 
Britain to Palestine. The essence of geopolitical British interest was security of British interests 
in the Suez Canal and communication with India. Hitherto, this objective was accomplished by 
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defending the Ottoman Empire from European rivals and their allies. In the decades preceding 
the First World War it seemed that the Ottoman Empire backed by Britain’s European rivals 
could be a threat to Suez. Humanitarianism, on the other hand, involved a genuine concern for 
the future of European Jewry, sometimes leavened by messianic Protestantism. Certain British 
politicians notably Palmerston, Lloyd George and Balfour believed they could successfully 
merge humanitarian philo-semitism with pragmatic geopolitics securing a better future for an 
oppressed people and their own empire simultaneously. However, their attitude was by no means 
shared by everyone. Former Viceroy of India Nathaniel Curzon and Secretary of State for India 
Edwin Montagu along with army officers in Palestine such as Generals Gilbert Clayton and 
Louis Bols were skeptical, or even openly hostile to Zionism. Also, in its pursuit of geopolitical 
objectives, Britain made deals with the Arabs and French, which seemed to pull in other 
directions from the Balfour Declaration: the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the Sykes-
Picot agreement, to name two.  
What paved the way for the Balfour Declaration, and eventual British mandate for 
Palestine, which from the legal point of the view carried a greater weight, was the outbreak of 
the First World War and the Ottoman Empire’s belated entry into it, resulting in the latter’s 
eventual dissolution. Having long preserved the Sultan’s lands from other powers, Britain now 
contemplated a division of his territories. As early as January 1915 the Home Secretary Herbert 
Samuel submitted an official proposal for the British annexation of Palestine, which synthesized 
decades of British interest in the security of Suez with the future of the Jews. In a post-war 
settlement, it could not be left to rivals like France or surrendered to unpredictable international 
administration. Palestine as a buffer state between the Suez Canal and either French or Russian 
future holdings emerged as a strategic necessity, which was covered politically by supporting the 
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establishment of a Jewish national home there. Also, support for Jews in Palestine would permit 
indirect rule via a settler community completely dependent on Britain. Under Lloyd George’s 
prime-ministership Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizmann were also close enough to the British 
government to influence policy formulation for Palestine. So the timing of the Declaration was 
related to the progress of the war against the Ottomans, advanced by certain key philo-semites in 
the British government, and an emergence of determined Zionists who were willing to support 
Britain and promise global Jewish support in return for a promise of restoration of their 
homeland. In the decades preceding the Declaration, not all of these factors had converged 
critically. 
However, after the adoption of the Balfour Declaration, there was little planning of how 
to implement the pledge to the Zionists. This allowed for alternative policy initiatives to emerge, 
especially among British imperial agents in the Middle East who backed Britain’s Arab allies 
and actively obstructed their government’s pro-Zionist policy. Nonetheless, they proved unable 
to alter the determination of policymakers in London, notably Colonial Secretary Winston 
Churchill, to fulfill Britain’s pledge, which they regarded as the prime justification for their 








Nineteenth century British interests in Palestine 
British interest in Palestine during the ninenteenth century was marked by essentially two 
impulses: geopolitics and humanitarianism. Viscount Palmerston is most commonly credited for 
expressing interest in the fate of both the Ottomans and the Jews. His motives were viewed as a 
combination of genuine philo-semitism, humanitarianism and responsible statesmanship.
9
 To 
some authors like Mayir Varete, Palmerston was not really led by his sympathy for Jews, but 
mainly by national interest and geopolitics.
10
 Britain had to strengthen its position at 
Constantinople and try to offset the influence of Russia and France. Both of these countries were 
able to exercise pressure on the Sublime Porte through the respective Orthodox and Catholic 
Maronite communities they claimed to protect. Britain could interpose itself as a patron of the 
Jews, and thus gain influence in Ottoman affairs.  
 Palmerston’s motives were more nuanced than this. Britain did not merely seek to 
reinforce its own leverage over the Sultan or compete more effectively with France or Russia. 
The ultimate objective throughout the nineteenth century was to preserve integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Akin to the Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward 
Grey and the official experts of the De Bunsen Committee in 1915,
11
 Palmerston too wanted to 
prevent predatory European powers or their allies from dismembering the Ottoman Empire and 
upsetting the balance of power. Only in that way would Britain’s ultimate geopolitical goal – 
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maintainance of its naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean- be safeguarded. To this end, 
Palmerston wanted to promote policies he perceived beneficial to the Ottomans. Support for the 
Jewish colonization, although based on certain mythical assumptions, was one of them:  
It is well known that the Jews of Europe possess great wealth; and it is manifest that any country 
in which a considerable number of them choose to settle, would derive great benefit from the 
Riches which they would bring into it....[It] would be of manifest importance to the Sultan to 
encourage the Jews to return to, and to settle in, Palestine; because the wealth which they would 
bring with them would increase the Resources of the Sultan’s Dominions; and the Jewish People, 
if returning under the Sanctions and Protection and at the Invitation of the Sultan, would be a 
check upon any future evil Designs of Mehemet Ali or his Successor.
12
 
Palmerston clearly believed in the power of Jews’ financial resources and their 
willingness to invest in the Ottoman Empire. In his mind, if Jewish funds were applied properly, 
the Ottomans’ ability to sustain their empire would be greatly improved. Following Mehmet 
Ali’s destabilizing invasion and occupation of Syria in the 1830s, British policymakers wanted to 
reinforce the Ottoman Empire against future clients of its main rival – France. The policy was 
supposed to be beneficial to Jews as well. They would be given an opportunity to return to their 
ancestral homeland and escape persecution experienced in Eastern Europe. To encourage Jewish 
interest in settling in Palestine, Palmerston moreover realized it was necessary to promote 
reformism in the Ottoman Empire
13
 and protection for minority rights. He emphasized that in 
order to benefit from Jewish immigration, the Sultan had to see that the laws protecting persons 
and property were observed.
14
 Skeptical of the effectiveness and speed of Ottoman laws, 
Palmerston insisted that the Jews, who had no effective way of presenting their case in 
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Constantinople, be given for a time a right to present their grievance through British diplomats.
15
 
He empowered the British vice-consul in Jerusalem to provide related protection to Jews in 
Palestine.
16
 Britain thus unilaterally elevated itself to a position of a protector of Ottoman Jews, 
which was part of greater objective of preserving integrity of the Ottoman Empire itself, and 
ultimately British interests.  
 On the humanitarian aspect of British nineteenth century involvement in Palestine, there 
was continuity with attitudes expressed later by Lloyd George, and Balfour. Palmerston was 
sympathetic to the plight of Jews, especially in Eastern Europe. In Britain, there had been a 
historic interest in their future. In part, this was caused by messianic Protestantism. Palmerston’s 
associate Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, played a big role. While 
being a highly religious person, Shaftesbury shared Palmerston’s compassion and 
humanitarianism. As a Member of Parliament he often stood up for the poor and sponsored the 
Ten Hours Bill, the Mines Act and the Lodging House Act.
17
 This compassionate activism 
combined with his fervent evangelical belief in restoration of the Biblical Jewish homeland to 
translate into support for pro-Zionist policies. He grew closer to radical premillennial 
interpretation of the Scriptures, which simultaneously influenced his missionary convictions, and 
commitment to social reform.
18
 These sentiments inspired him to work with Palmerston on 
furthering pro-Jewish policy in the Middle East. Shaftesbury’s views were similar to those of 
Lloyd George two generations later: “We have done a deed…which the Jews will regard as an 
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honour to their nation; and have thereby conciliated a body of well-wishers in every people 
under heaven.”
19
 Moreover, he thought the policy practical: “if we consider their return in the 
light of a new establishment or colonization of Palestine, we shall find it to be the cheapest and 
safest mode…they will return at their own expense, and with no hazard but to themselves, they 
will submit to the existing form of Government, having no preconceived theories to gratify.”
20
 
Shaftesbury’s sentiment misjudged the conscious nationalistic intention of the later European 
Jewish intellectuals like Theodore Herzl and Weizmann. However, this was decades before 
Herzl’s idea of Jewish state or nation, and given his evangelical conviction, Shaftesbury seemed 
to have viewed Jews as passive enactors of Christian millennialism.
21
 By contrast, Palmerston 
was a pragmatic man. He did not share Shaftesbury’s mystical visions about the future of 
Palestine, but he was eager to accept practical policies which furthered Britain’s goal of 
preserving the Ottoman Empire.
22
 
Humanitarianism was of course the driving force of influential Anglo-Jewish 
sensibilities, especially for Sir Moses Montefiore. He was the very wealthy Sheriff of London 
and a gentleman knighted by Queen Victoria in 1837.
23
 He assisted Jewish communities in 
Palestine financially and politically. During Mehmet Ali’s war against Sultan Mahmud II he 
planned to create a colonization company in Palestine which would establish autonomous and 
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 While the project did not materialize, Montefiore continued 
diligent work to assist the existing Jewish communities financially and fund new medical 
facilities, orange groves, and a relief fund for victims of famine.
25
 
In the end, Palmerston’s goal of Jewish settlements in Palestine did not work. The 
Ottoman Empire, which was being encroached on by a variety of European powers and 
internally disturbed by nationalist movements, resisted British initiatives. Ottoman ministers 
Rashid Pasha and Saib Pasha explained to the dragoman of the British Embassy at 
Constantinople that: “[to] give the Jews the right of presenting their complaints to the Porte 
through the channels of the British authorities is as good as placing them under protection of 
England and effecting a blow to the independence of the Turkish Government.”
26
 This would set 
a dangerous precedent and would invite other powers, France and Russia, to seek similar rights 
for their protégés.
27
 It would in effect weaken the Ottoman Empire. After Palmerston, no serious 
involvement in sponsoring Jewish colonization of Palestine, let alone British military action, was 
considered by the government. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Britain 
remained preoccupied with Egypt, which it occupied under the Prime Minister William 
Gladstone in 1882; for the time being Palestine was marginalized in its imperial calculations,
28
 
much as romantic and religious undercurrents remained. 
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The 1882 occupation of Egypt partly reversed the policy of strengthening and protecting 
the Ottoman Empire pursued since the 1830s and again during the Crimean War 1853-56. 
Indeed, in the 1880s Britain was concerned about delimiting Ottoman influence on Egypt. This 
combined with Gladstone’s anti-Hamidian sentiment,
29
 denunciation of the massacres of 
Ottoman Christians, and the subsequent rise of German influence at the Ottoman court
30
 led to 
cooling of British-Ottoman relations. However even Gladstone recognized a need to maintain the 
Ottoman Empire.
31
 When Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury, entered prime 
ministerial office in 1886, however, Britain focused on naval bases in Alexandria and Cyprus, 
which were deemed sufficient, and indeed rendered protection of the Ottoman Empire, most 
notably its capital, superfluous.
32
 It would not be until the early 1900s when Palestine was 
seriously considered an imperial objective, when this comparative neglect was seen to concede 
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Build-up to the First World War 
Britain’s view of Palestine in early 1900s was part of a larger policy context concerning the 
Ottoman Empire. Relations between London and Constantinople had deteriorated. Nevertheless, 
British policymakers still believed that their interests were better served if the Ottoman Empire 
remained intact. In the early twentieth century the British started to embrace a new vision of the 
world sensing where their position was threatened by newly emerging rival powers. There was 
also new terminology to accompany this vision. The term “Middle East” was for the first time 
used by an American naval officer Alfred T. Mahan in his 1902 article for National Review.
33
  It 
was further propagated by Valentine Chirol, an influential journalist for The Times. His articles 
emphasized the German threat, and a need to secure vital strategic areas such as the Persian Gulf 
and the approaches to India. To Chirol, the old Eastern Question was essentially replaced by the 
Middle Eastern Question.
34
 He was alarmed by what he saw as Germany’s desire to expand its 
influence into the Middle East. Kaiser William II visited Abdul Hamid II in Constantinople and 
Damascus in 1898, declared German friendship for Muslims, and later encouraged German 
financial and industrial ventures in the Ottoman Empire.
35
 Chirol wrote how “for William II 
Constantinople was already the bridge over which Germany was to pass out of Europe into Asia 
and enter upon a vast field of splendid adventure.”
36
 German backing allowed Abdul Hamid to 
reassert his role as the Caliph, and thereby influence Muslim sentiments from Egypt to India. 
The Sultan also devoted himself to the Hejaz railroad which linked Constantinople to Mecca.
37
 
In addition to modernizing the Hajj, the railway was a German-backed design by the Ottomans 
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which allowed them to move closer to British controlled Suez.
38
 Part of British concerns related 
to German flirtation with Islam, especially by Max von Oppenheim, a member of the Cairo 
consulate who was known for Anglophobia. He established contacts with anti-British Egyptian 
nationalists like Mustafa Kamil, a founder of the National Party,
39
 and alleged how an anti-
British uprising would follow if the Sultan led an army across Sinai.
40
 
Apart from Chirol, Sir Halford Mackinder was another influential figure who analyzed 
British imperial circumstances mentalities in early 1900s. Mackinder was an academic 
geographer, and Conservative Party politician close to Parliamentary pro-imperialists of both 
parties. In his study, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, he labeled Russia a pivot state, 
because it mastered Central Asia with its vast resources.
41
 To him, seaborne empires like 
Britain’s were vulnerable, and the only way to strengthen it was through greater economic 
integration with its colonies and the adoption of protective tariffs.
42
 Mackinder believed the 
“Columbian Epoch”, a period of superiority of maritime power such as Britain’s, was 
declining.
43
 While the Suez Canal gave an advantage to maritime powers, the key to future 
supremacy lied in development of trans-continental railways which: “[were] now transmuting the 
conditions of land-power, and nowhere [could] they have such an effect as in the closed heart-
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 Russia expanded its railroad network to six thousand miles and sent its 
troops to Manchuria much like the British navy was able to carry British army to South Africa in 
1902, thus proving land-mobility did not lag behind sea-power.
45
 A real threat coming from pivot 
state was its potential alliance with Germany and expansion over marginal areas of Eurasia to 
access ocean and build a navy that would challenge Britain.
46
 
Meanwhile, as for British Ottoman policy, it was essentially shaped by three sets of 
considerations. First, the British attempted to compete with financial and other ventures of their 
rivals. Second, geopolitics continued to be instrumental to overall policy, especially considering 
the perception of Turco-Germanic threat to Egypt. Third, unlike in Palmerston’s era, 
humanitarian support for Zionism did not receive a strong backing in this period. Nonetheless, 
overtures made by Theodore Herzl, an Austrian Jew and a father of modern Zionism, to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain ensured it remained a possibility. 
First, economic interests were vital component to overall British policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire. London’s policies were shaped by commerce from which strategic imperatives 
followed and which diplomacy served allowing Britain to uphold its interests.
47
 The reverse was 
the case, too. As investments in the Ottoman Empire gradually diminished, it was followed by a 
decline in the influence of the British government.
48
 City of London capitalists became cautious 
about expensive ventures following Ottoman default in 1876, and they sold most of their 
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holdings to the French and Germans.
49
 British Ottoman policy was accordingly reappraised in 
the 1880s. Therefore, a decline in economic engagement went hand to hand with decreasing 
British diplomatic intimacy with the Porte. The central pillar of economic involvement with the 
Ottoman Empire remained British interest in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA). It 
had operated since 1881 when the French-controlled Imperial Ottoman Bank and Deutsche Bank 
cooperated to restructure debt repayments to all foreign shareholders. This was done mainly 
through the collection of tobacco taxes and duties on stamps, fish, and alcoholic beverages.
50
 
However, Britain’s share of PDA was relatively small (fifteen per cent) compared to German and 
French shares (twenty-two and sixty three per cent).
51
 Reflecting on the position before the First 
World War, Foreign Secretary Grey felt “[we] sacrificed our influence and material interests in 
Turkey; we did indeed keep our hands clean and acquit the national conscience…[but] 
Germany…exploited the situation steadily to her own advantage.”
52
 In a reversal of tradition, 
Grey attempted to revive diplomatic influence in Turkey via economic investment through the 
British-owned National Bank of Turkey in 1909. Yet, the project failed because London 
investors did not support it.
53
 
Of greater concern were railroad projects. Britain was alarmed after concessions for the 
Baghdad railroad went to the Germans in 1902. The central issue was concern over the British 
position in the Gulf, and strategic interests in Persia and Mesopotamia. In 1909 a subcommittee 
examined the project: “British claims to political predominance in the Gulf are based mainly 
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upon the fact of our commercial interests having hitherto been predominant, and should our 
trade, as a result of a German forward commercial policy, be impaired, our political influence 
would proportionately diminish.”
54
 While objecting to the railroad proposal for years, an 
agreement was nonetheless reached in 1914. It ensured that extension of the railway would not 
jeopardize British predominance in the Gulf, or allow other powers to establish themselves on 
the coast.
55
 It was, however, the development of the Hejaz railway that let to strategic 
reconsideration of Palestine’s position, preceding an eventual invasion during the First World 
War. 
The security of Egypt became a priority for London following the Aqaba incident of 
1906. The background to British concerns over Egypt went back to its occupation of the country 
in 1882. Since then, a number of factors worried British policymakers, not least of which were 
limits imposed by international obligations on the size and deployment of British forces in 
Egypt.
56
 The 1906 incident seemed minor: in January 1906 the Ottomans dispatched two 
battalions to fortify positions at Aqaba alongside the Hejaz railway, and later prevented Egyptian 
forces from landing nearby.
57
 This dispute was resolved in October 1906 when the Sultan was 
pressed to accept new delineations of the border.
58
 However, the event led to important 
discussions in the newly formed Committee of Imperial Defense (CID). In July 1906, the Chief 
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of the Imperial General Staff Sir John French circulated a memo on the threat presented to 
Egypt. He argued how a war could be started by the German-backed Turks after a minor border 
dispute, perhaps using Aqaba as a base.
59
 More importantly, General French challenged the 
notion that natural barriers, such as the hundred and thirty miles of desert separating the Suez 
Canal from the Levant, would be enough to protect Egypt from modern armies. He believed the 
Ottomans could assemble a hundred-thousand strong force and use railroads alongside the 
Egyptian border to deploy this army and cross the desert on camels.
60
 While Sir Evelyn Baring, 
later Lord Cromer, who was Consul-General of Egypt, initially believed such an invasion was 
improbable,
61
 at another meeting he advised investigating what pressure could be placed on the 
Ottomans by operations around Haifa.
62
 Later, a subcommittee of the CID recommended:  
In the event of such invasion being attempted, we accept the opinion given by the General 
Staff…that it would be better dealt with by an attack on Haifa than by a dispatch of an army to 
oppose it from Egypt. Such an attack would not only threaten the communication of the Turkish 
forces operating in the Peninsula but would also encourage the tribes east of Hedjaz Railway 
whose hostility to Turkey is well known.
63
 
Thus the old notion of naval power proved decisive as it did in 1840-41 when it was used to 
protect the Ottoman Empire from the ambitious Egyptian ruler Mehmet Ali.  
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The Subcommittee’s findings were significant in several ways. They highlighted 
Britain’s readiness to depart from its long established policy of not intervening in the Ottoman 
affairs.
64
 Palestine, rather than other parts of the Ottoman Empire, was considered as a suitable 
place for intervention. Also, it gave a hint of the policy that would be pursued through the First 
World War: turning the minorities of the Ottoman Empire against it.
65
 In the end, however, no 
military action was undertaken. Politicians and the General Staff favored political pressures on 
the Ottomans
66
 over a risky intervention. Still, the Aqaba incident remained an important 
moment and influenced strategic thinking on Palestine when the war finally broke out. 
Meanwhile, the new Zionist movement was not able to win concrete political support 
from the British in the pre-war period, but did engage in certain overtures. In 1902 Herzl made a 
proposal to Colonial Secretary Chamberlain to establish a colony not in Palestine, but rather in El 
Arish and elsewhere in the Sinai Peninsula.
67
 While recognizing the land he demanded was 
“worthless and almost uninhabited”, he argued it could be transformed by Jewish hard work and 
capital from Eastern Europe.
68
 This would offer Britain a rich colony, hundreds of thousands of 
productive citizens and ten million other Jews worldwide who would be her “secret but loyal 
subjects.”
69
 However, the proposal was skeptically received by Lord Cromer. He emphasized 
problems of the ill-defined frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt at Sinai.
70
 More 
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significantly, Cromer predicted Egypt’s opposition to the creation of a Jewish colony on its 
territory, especially since many of these immigrants would likely be protected by capitulations, 
which were subject to numerous abuses.
71
 For centuries Europeans were able to obtain 
concessions from the Ottomans to place their subjects under immunity from local laws, which 
caused resentment from the locals. The alternative would be subjecting Jewish colonists to 
Egyptian law, which Cromer thought would be unattractive to Jews. He also believed a creation 
of cosmopolitan and politically driven Jewish settlement in Sinai would be difficult to reconcile 
with Egyptian or Turkish interests and would inevitably exacerbate already complex frictions.
72
 
Consequently, Herzl was urged by the Foreign Secretary Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Fifth 
Marquess of Lansdowne, to abandon the project, which was expensive and difficult to support in 
already complicated Egyptian circumstances.
73
 Chamberlain was still willing to offer East 
Africa. He was of Unitarian background
74
 and was interested in social activism and the fate of 
underprivileged groups at home and abroad, including for instance the Ottoman Christians.
75
 
When Herzl approached him in 1902, Chamberlain had similar sympathies for the Jews. 
Moreover, supporting their colony offered a pragmatic solution to the paucity of white farmers in 
the Kenyan highlands, which Britain wished to develop. Nonetheless, he doubted the area would 
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appeal to Zionists given that it was “too far removed from Palestine.”
76
 Indeed, Herzl found it 
difficult to convince his fellow Zionists to support such a venture, and so it was abandoned.  
Early years of the war 
After these false starts, the First World War was nevertheless a turning point in Anglo-Zionist 
relations, culminating with the Balfour Declaration. A number of factors facilitated this. First, 
the war with the Ottomans opened a realistic possibility of breaking up their empire. British 
strategic thinking in this period continued to be guided by geopolitical assessments of key 
strategic outposts. In that regard, it was a mixture of old and new ways of viewing the Middle 
East, where certain priorities (i.e. keeping both wartime enemies and allies away from the Suez 
Canal and the approaches to India), which the likes of Valentine Chirol long emphasized. Yet, by 
the third year of the war support for Zionism had emerged as a means to such ends and genuine 
philo-semitic sentiment levered this development into the minds of important political figures.  
After less than six months of war, an official proposal for the conquest of Palestine and 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire was put forward to the Cabinet. It was authored by Herbert 
Samuel, Liberal Home Secretary, and the first British Jew to serve in the government.
77
 Samuel 
claimed to have been supported by the Foreign Secretary Grey on 9 November 1914:  
I spoke to Sir Edward Grey…about the future of Palestine…I said that now that Turkey had 
thrown herself into the European War and that it was probable her empire would be broken up, 
the question of the future control of Palestine was likely to arise. The jealousies of the great 
European Powers would make it difficult to allot the country to one of them. I thought that 
British influence ought to play a considerable part…because the geographical situation of 
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Palestine, and especially the proximity to Egypt…Grey said that the idea had always had a strong 
sentimental attraction to him.
78
 
Samuel claimed he was not a Zionist at the time.
79
 His interest in the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine nonetheless was precipitated by changing circumstances, and he began to see a chance 
to transform Palestine into a center of a new culture and fountain of enlightenment.
80
 In January 
1915, Samuel presented a memorandum to his colleagues, which echoing Herzl a decade earlier 
“would win for England the lasting gratitude of Jews throughout the world. In the United States, 
where they number about 2,000,000, and in all the other lands where they are scattered, they 
would form a body of opinion whose bias…would be favourable to the British Empire.”
81
 He 
even stressed prestigious side of adding the historic land of Palestine to the empire and thus 
bolstering the British prestige among its diverse subjects.
82
 His observations on strategic issues 
were similar to those put forward by Sir John French in 1906: “[the] belt of desert to the east of 
Suez Canal is an admirable strategic frontier…But it would be inadequate defense if a great 
European Power were established on the further side. A military expedition organized from 
Southern Palestine…would be formidable.”
83
 In a revised draft of March 1915, Samuel advanced 
the strategic value of port-cities Haifa and Jaffa, which although underdeveloped, could be 
improved and would secure vital naval advantages in support of Alexandria.
84
 Interestingly, he 
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admitted that an autonomous Jewish state was unrealistic at this point, given that Jews numbered 
only one sixth of Palestine’s total population. This would necessitate overall British authority.  
Several important elements stood out from Samuel’s memo. Like those before him, he 
urged Britain not to allow a powerful European neighbor to establish a colony in proximity of 
Suez.
85
 Since he believed in the inevitability of an Ottoman defeat and collapse, the only viable 
solution was the British occupation of Palestine. Second, he considered possible 
internationalization of Palestine dysfunctional due to conflicting interests, with a German take-
over also possible.
86
 He pointed out significant German investments in country like banks, 
hospitals and agricultural societies. Any form of Turkish suzerainty he dismissed as the 
perpetuation of a failing system, while French rule would meet domestic resistance. Samuel also 
emphasized international opinion as a potent force that could shape the course of the war. This 
factor would continue to influence minds of other British policymakers. Just like Palmerston 
seventy five years earlier, Samuel, Lloyd George and others shared a belief in the power of Jews 
worldwide to influence their respective governments. Despite Samuel’s enthusiasm, this vision 
was not shared by Asquith or Grey who were interested in preserving a status quo in the Middle 
East. The Prime Minister was a level-headed man who thought Zionism a fantastic dream.
87
 He 
was “not attracted by this proposed addition to…responsibilities.”
88
 Nevertheless, Samuel 
claimed Grey was still open to his idea, albeit preferring internationalization over a British 
protectorate, especially given multiple interests in the Holy Places.
89
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However, despite of their dislike of territorial aggrandizement, Asquith
90
 and Grey had to 
define the British position. Their allies sought to divide the Ottoman Empire. The Russians 
initiated discussions which led to the Constantinople agreement in March 1915.
91
 It was a 
milestone departure from the older policy because it recognized Russia’s right to capture Istanbul 
and the European shore of the Straits.
92
 As a result of this, Britain and France had to be 
compensated elsewhere. It led to two developments: the formation of a Committee on British 
desiderata in Asiatic Turkey, and a separate arrangement with France.  
Asquith appointed an interdepartmental committee led by a diplomat Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen to identify the best strategy and key interests in case the Ottoman Empire was to be 
dissolved. One of the leading figures at the De Bunsen Committee was Mark Sykes. He was a 
Tory politician and Lord Kitchener’s personal representative at the Committee.
93
 Horatio 
Kitchener was the Secretary of State for War and a former Consul-General in Egypt, and his 
views reflected Cairo’s position on British desiderata in Middle East. Institutional rivalry became 
a feature of the British geopolitical thinking during the war. London, its imperial agents in Cairo, 
and the government of India, often had different, and sometimes conflicting, visions and interests 
in the Middle East.  
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Cairo and Delhi disagreed not only on a definition of Muslim opinion, which to Cairo 
meant Arab opinion; to India it reflected sentiment of its Muslim population, but they also 
disputed which Arab leader to approach.
94
 Delhi thought Ibn Saud was worth supporting, while 
Kitchener’s lieutenants made overtures to Saud’s rival, Hashemite Emir Hussein of Hejaz, the 
hereditary custodian of Mecca and Medina.
95
 This High Commissioner in Egypt Sir Henry 
McMahon exchanged ten letters with Hussein between July 1915 and March 1916, and made 
territorial and political promises of British recognition of an Arab state in return of revolt against 
Turks. The key correspondence was sent on 24 October 1915. McMahon expressed readiness to 
“recognize and support the Independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits 
and boundaries proposed by Sherif of Mecca.”
96
 It was conditional on Hussein’s recognition of 
special British interest and rights of administration in the Mesopotamian vilayets of Basra and 
Baghdad, as well as France’s claims to districts Mersina and Alexandretta and those West of line 
Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo.
97
 In spite of reservations over the likelihood of a unified 
Arab state and India’s concerns over interference in Muslim religious affairs,
98
 the main 
controversy centered on the vague language of McMahon’s letter and ill-defined borders, which 
caused lasting confusion, especially in relation to future of Palestine as a potential Arab state.  
At the De Bunsen Committee, Mark Sykes exercised significant influence. Over the 
course of months he devised a decentralization scheme which would construct five distinct 
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historic provinces in the Ottoman Empire: Anatolia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Iraq-Jazirah.
99
 
Like Kitchener, he was suspicious of Russia, and wanted to create a buffer zone between British 
interest in the post-Ottoman Middle East and any Russian sphere of influence.
100
 One way of 
accomplishing this was by having a French sphere of influence border the Russian one. When 
Kitchener campaigned for the acquisition of Alexandretta, Sykes was able to push through his 
choice of Haifa, stressing French interest in Alexandretta, Haifa’s proximity to Egypt and chance 
to connect it to Rowandiz in Mesopotamia with a new railroad.
101
 
The Committee’s report was presented on 30 June 1915.
102
 It considered four 
possibilities: A) partition of the Ottoman Empire with limited Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia, 
B) nominal maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in name and form, but with actual supremacy of 
other powers through spheres of political and economic interest, C) preservation of the empire as 
it was before the war with minor territorial losses and D) a decentralization model, where the 
independence of the Ottoman Empire would be preserved, but its system of governance would be 
modified along federal lines.
103
 If the partition scheme was to be adopted, the Committee 
considered crucial areas and urged acquisition of vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, all of 
Sinai and central and western Palestine.  Sykes’ recommendation on Haifa was recognized: “if 
Alexandretta were acquired by Great Britain, France could not be refused the southern part of 
Syria, which would bring her frontier into Arabia, a situation which we could scarcely 
tolerate…Haifa, which, though not such a good natural harbour as Alexandretta, is capable of 
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development into a sufficiently good port, and of connection by railway with Mesopotamia.”
104
 
In the end however, the Committee saw the decentralization scheme as the best way of securing 
British interests.
105
 It believed the military liabilities of partition would be extensive.
106
 
Decentralization on the other hand would save Britain a burden of occupation and allow the 
preservation of key commercial interests.
107
 On Palestine, the recommendation was similar to 
what Grey told Samuel: “Palestine must be recognized as a country whose destiny must be the 
subject of special negotiations in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested.”
108
 
The De Bunsen Committee’s recommendations were significant in several ways. While 
they were never officially adopted by the government, they remained an important guiding 
principle for British policymakers.
109
 This was certainly the case with Mark Sykes’ later 
initiatives. Also, they indicated the non-annexationist character of British policy under the 
Asquith government.
110
 There was a clear recommendation for extending indirect influence in 
the Ottoman Empire over costly future military-administrative engagements. In that sense, it was 
not very different from policies pursued throughout the nineteenth century. Also, the De Bunsen 
Committee experts hoped that restraint of British ambitions would also keep those of their allies 
in check, and the concession of Constantinople to Russia might not lead to the partition of the 
rest of Ottoman Empire.
111
 However, the issue of Zionism was not even mentioned.  
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 Accordingly, in 1916 France and Britain reached a mutual agreement on the division of 
Ottoman territories, the Sykes-Picot agreement. This settlement was important because similarly 
to the De Bunsen Committee, its pursuit of British strategic objectives never referred to Zionism. 
At the core of the agreement was a division of the spheres of influence between France (area A) 
and Britain (area B) over an independent Arab state or confederation of Arab states, which both 
countries pledged to recognize and protect.
112
 The two states also agreed on blue (French) and 
red (British) areas where they could establish direct or indirect rule. Sykes was able to secure 
most of what he emphasized at the CID Committee in 1915, including crucial railway 
connections from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Haifa and Acre would be acquired, as well as 
the right for Britain: “to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with 
area (b), and…have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.”
113
 France 
secured parts of the Palestinian and Syrian coasts including Alexandretta. Another 
disappointment for Zionists
114
 was an unfavorable arrangement on rest of Palestine: “there shall 
be established an international administration (for Jerusalem), the form of which is to be decided 
upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and 
the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.”
115
 There were many issues with this agreement, not 
least of which was its conflict with assurances given to rulers of Hejaz. Hussein thought vilayets 
Aleppo and Beirut as well as Syria’s western maritime coast, which were to be directly or 
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indirectly ruled by France, were historic Arab provinces where “Moslem [was] indistinguishable 
from the Christian.”
116
 Therefore, these should become a part of an independent Arab state. On 
the other hand, the Foreign Office doubted the Arab revolt would even take place, or be effective 
at all, but it was nonetheless important to prevent an emergence of a Turco-Arab alliance.
117
 In 
the end, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence was connected with the Sykes-Picot 
arrangement in so far as the Arab state, where France and Britain would exercise influence, was 
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Impact of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
At the time of his negotiations with Picot, Mark Sykes was not a Zionist. He had no instructions 
to consider Jewish claims in Palestine. Nor were the Zionists aware of Anglo-French secret 
negotiations. Jewish interest in the future of the country was recognized as solely conscientious 
and sentimental.
119
 The Jews were perceived as having a religious rather than political stake in 
Palestine, much like other sectarian groups. Sykes was instructed by Foreign Secretary Grey not 
to commit Britain to sponsorship of any group, and instead to look for a solution that would 
alleviate conflicting claims.
120
 Moreover, he was supposed to avoid conflict with France over 
Palestine, which was why he agreed to a vague international administration in the country.   
The Sykes-Picot agreement had many British critics. The Arab Bureau felt Sykes gave up 
too much to Picot, and essentially failed the Arabs
121
 whom Britain promised a kingdom. Sir 
Arthur Hirtzel, Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office, lamented the 
loss of Alexandretta and Mosul, which allowed the French to control that part of the Baghdad 
Railway.
122
 One far reaching consequence of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was how the 
dissatisfaction it caused among various key figures in British government ironically stimulated 
even greater territorial ambitions in the Middle East, preemptive in character, in the final years of 
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 This became more pronounced when Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 
December 1916.  
The key criticism of the Sykes-Picot agreement came from Director of Division of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI) Captain Reginald W. Hall. DNI was in charge of the key “Room 40” code-
breaking unit, where experts deciphered messages from German Navy, Army and Foreign 
Service.
124
 Among their impressive accomplishments was interception of the Zimmerman 
Telegram in January 1917.
125
 This precipitated U.S. entry into the war against Germany. Hall 
had a strong standing in Naval Intelligence. Balfour, who replaced Winston Churchill as the First 
Lord of Admiralty trusted Hall and gave him a free hand in handling the Zimmermann Telegram 
with the Americans.
126
 The Admiralty had its own interests in the Middle East. The First Sea 
Lord John Fisher congratulated Samuel on his Palestine memorandum from January 1915.
127
 
Also, Captain Hall was in charge of Egyptian railways and learned from captured Zionist 
agricultural expert Aaron Aaronsohn, who spent years in Middle East, about water supplies in 
Sinai and Palestine and possible railroad projects across the desert.
128
 At his insistence, David 
Hogarth, who worked in Naval Intelligence, rather than Mark Sykes became head of the Arab 
Bureau.
129
 As for the Sykes-Picot agreement, Hall emphasized the strategic disadvantages for 
Britain and questioned its reliance on Arabs, suggesting using the Zionists to advance British 
                                                          
123
Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916-19, (London: Frank Cass, 
1999), pp.25-26. 
124
Jacob Rosen, “Captain Reginald Hall and the Balfour Declaration,” Middle Eastern Studies 
24, no. 1 (1988): 57-58. 
125
Admiral Sir William James, The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir 
Reginald Hall (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1956), pp.135-141, 153-154. 
126
Ibid., pp.143-145.  
127
John Bowle, Viscount Samuel: A Biography (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1957), pp.178. 
128
H.V.F. Winstone, The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the 
Middle East from 1898-1926 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 
1987), pp.194-195, 234-235. 
129
Adelson, Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur, pp.198-199. 
30 
 
interests indirectly in Palestine. Hall deplored concessions to the French: “under the proposed 
agreement we not only [abandoned] any possibility in the future of using Alexandretta as a naval 
base, but [allowed] a powerful opponent to do so, and [excluded] from the British sphere of 
influence Aleppo and rich cultivable country to the east.”
130
 Hall stressed how Britain had to see 
that future agreements ensured her position in Egypt by way of “exclusive control of all railways 
in South Palestine; by occupation of an extension of Egyptian territory north and east into part of 




Moreover, he questioned the effectiveness of the British policy of courting Arab 
assistance against the Ottomans. If Britain was to have any success there, a demonstration of 
force was needed because “force [was] the best Arab propaganda.”
132
 He doubted any such 
action was planned. More significantly, Hall questioned Arab unity and believed they sought 
independence, not ties to Britain.
133
 He proposed alliance with the Jews who had “a strong 
material, and a very strong political, interests in the future of the country.”
134
 They opposed 
recognition of an Arab state that included Palestine. Finally, Hall believed that Zionism should 
be considered in the “Brown Area”, designated to international administration in the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, and linked it to the British need to ensure control over entire railroad system in 
Palestine for the sake of security of Egypt.
135
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Reginald Hall’s 13 January 1916 memorandum openly disagreed with the De Bunsen 
Committee on the division of sphere of influence in Asiatic Turkey. The Sykes-Picot agreement 
was a mistake which only helped strengthen French position. Hall looked beyond the war and 
anticipated allies as tomorrow’s competitors. His emphasis on the importance of Palestine to the 
security of Egypt nonetheless demonstrated continuity with past strategists in the Committee of 
Imperial Defence like Sir John French in 1906.  Hall suggested that supporting Zionists could 
secure Palestine for Britain. More importantly, this was a view shared by Minister of Munitions 
(by the end of the year Prime Minister) Lloyd George. Hall was also credited by some for 
converting to his views the very man whose memorandum he criticized in January 1916.
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December 1916: Lloyd George forms a coalition government 
Lloyd George’s rise to headship of the government in December 1916 was a turning point for 
Britain during the First World War. It also transformed British relationships with Zionism. Non-
annexationists and non-Zionists Asquith and Grey were out of office. The new leader relied on 
the pro-imperialist Tories like Curzon and Milner in the War Cabinet which determined more 
assertive territorial desiderata.
137
Other important figures, who were interested in both 
expansionism and Zionism, were new assistant secretaries to War Cabinet Amery and Sykes, 
while Balfour succeeded Grey in the Foreign Office.
138
 No less significant was Lloyd George’s 
close association with Zionist leader Weizmann, which predated his rise to prime-ministership. 
The new leader was often at odds with those opposing his interest in campaigns against the 
Ottomans, especially the Chief of the Imperial General Staff William Robertson. Robertson 
believed the Egyptian campaign had to concentrate solely on defense of Suez.
139
 He was of the 
military school that considered war could be won by defeating Germany in Western Europe, 
while other theaters of operation were less relevant side-shows.
140
 Disastrous outcomes of 
Dardanelles/Gallipoli and the late 1915 Salonika expedition cooled military interest in the 
Middle East. But, Lloyd George blamed the Imperial General Staff for the failure to defeat of 
Turks in 1915-1916 and for four hundred thousand men Britain lost.
141
 As a prime minister, he 
circumvented opposition by using interdepartmental and ad-hoc committees, and excluded 
military men from cabinet meetings.
142
 He worked with men who shared his views, even if it 
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meant policies were devised by a small group. He also kept his own counsel and represented 
Britain himself at the main inter-Allied meetings.
143
 All of this was important for understanding 
conditions in which decisions, like the Balfour Declaration, emerged.  
Lloyd George’s Middle Eastern policy was characterized by two strands in his thinking: a 
military offensive against the Ottoman Empire, and a sentimental predisposition towards 
Zionism.  Often labeled the “Easterner”, he believed the war could be ended sooner if Germany’s 
allies were knocked out of the conflict, so he began a shift in military strategy and ordered 
attacks on the Ottoman position across Suez into Palestine. “[The] Suez Canal was [the] gateway 
of the East,” he reflected, “[so] our campaign across the Canal in the direction of Palestine was a 
highly important offensive-defensive, so far as the interests of the British Empire were 
concerned.”
144
 Moreover, Lloyd George disliked the Sykes-Picot agreement which he called “a 
fatuous arrangement.”
145
 He was suspicious of France, contemplated revising the agreement, and 
considered creating a Jewish buffer zone against French possessions.
146
 
Palestine therefore became a crucial element in his strategic thought. Lloyd George’s 
sympathy for the Zionist cause was also a mixture of his own Christian upbringing, philo-
semitism and a belief in the propagandist value of supporting the Jews. He was from the start 
supportive of the Samuel’s Memorandum which “[appealed] to the poetic and imaginative as 
well as to the romantic and religious qualities of his mind.”
147
 While not able to win Asquith 
over, he would later work with Samuel and select him as the first British High Commissioner in 
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 Lloyd George was a devout Christian brought up on the Bible.
149
 His interest in 
Zionism and Palestine predated his prime-ministership. In 1906, as a member of the Liberal 
government, he helped early Zionist proposals for the colonization of Sinai. This was rejected 
but deepened Lloyd George’s understanding of the goals of a movement with which he 
sympathized until prime minster himself.
150
  
His association with Zionists like Weizmann led to a collaboration that lasted for years. 
They first met in December 1914 when Lloyd George informed the latter of his interest in 
Palestine. Later, Weizmann helped the British by sharing discovery of the fermentation process 
that addressed Britain’s paucity of acetone, which was needed for explosives, especially for 
naval munitions.
151
 Indeed, Lloyd George later claimed Palestine was given to the Zionists as a 
reward for Weizmann’s technical assistance, much as this claim was disputed by both Weizmann 
and Samuel.
152
 Nonetheless, once he formed his coalition government, Lloyd George’s 
cooperation with Weizmann became far-reaching and, shifting from Asquith’s indifference to the 
establishment of a Jewish Palestine as safeguarding British interests in the Middle East.
153
 
However, there were also pragmatic considerations. One was the issue of propaganda. 
Lloyd George saw the value of a pro-Jewish declaration for gaining wide support for the Allies: 
“[it] was part of our propagandist strategy for mobilizing every opinion and force throughout the 
world which would weaken the enemy and improve Allied chances. Propaganda on both sides 
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probably played a greater part in the last war than any other.”
154
 It was indeed a powerful tool. It 
also reflected a continued perception of hidden and powerful Jewish influence on world affairs 
which Lloyd George and Balfour shared with the past British statesmen like Palmerston. Part of 
this assumption was that some Jewish groups were dangerous. British sponsorship of Zionism 
was also connected to the Manichean perception that nationalist movements were normative and 
good, while de-nationalized, ethnic movements could easily be controlled by the Germans.
155
 
Moreover, Britain had to become a patron over the movement which was hitherto a Jewish 
offshoot of German nationalist intellectual currents, dominated by German speakers. Therefore, 
Zionist Jews had to be supported in order to prevent Jews from being won over by the enemy.
156
 
Furthermore, while advocating a Palestine campaign, the British media heralded the 
offensive as a new or Last Crusade and tried to imbue the soldiers with knightly zeal. The Prime 
Minister believed in the moral value of capturing of Jerusalem, which not only opened the door 
to the return of chosen people to their homeland, but also “cheered our own people at a critical 
time.”
157
 Lloyd George launched anti-Turkish slogans such as “The Turk must go!”, and Mark 
Sykes wanted the Allies to capitalize following their capture of the Holy City.
158
 He believed that 
impact upon all Christians would have been significant because Jerusalem was “so profoundly 
impressed as a name and an idea on all who have been reared in a Christian environment.”
159
  
The idea of an overt propaganda was not without controversy, especially given the concerns over 
Muslim agitation. These issues were taken into account and to avoid a provocation, General 
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Edmund Allenby, the British Commander-in-Chief, decided to enter the city on foot. The whole 
ceremony was devoid of Anglican or Christian symbols, and instead, it represented the entire 
Allied constituency by adding the commanders of the French and Italian contingents, despite the 
fact that victory was achieved without their help.
160
 In the end however, it could be assumed the 
military campaign would have proceeded even without attempts to revive the crusader spirit. The 
propaganda proved to be of limited use. The pre-war literature like Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe and 
emerging public school ethos especially boys’ movements and sports like cricket reinvigorated 
ideals of chivalry, honor, patriotism, and were recognized by the Royal Commission on the 
Public Schools in 1864 as useful in teaching social qualities and manly virtues.
161
 While they 
helped mobilize young gentlemen, the impact of crusading spirit on ordinary soldiers in 1917 
was not great.
162
 The majority of British people associated Palestine not with the Crusades, but 
rather with the Old and New Testaments, the Sunday school and religious tradition, and this 
reflected emotional distance between the makers of propaganda and their targets.
163
 
The timing of the Declaration was significantly connected to successful effort to receive 
President Wilson’s support, and a belief that Britain had to prevent Germany from capturing the 
Zionist Movement. The Americans were first approached in September 1917, but were cautious 
not to endorse a statement that would carry a real commitment.
164
 Also, the U.S. remained 
suspicious of the British plans in the Middle East and had reservations about backing a statement 
concerning Palestine, still part of the Ottoman Empire, with whom Washington was not at 
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 However, after Weizmann and American Zionist Louis Brandeis intensified their 
lobbying, the support was received on 16 October 1917. The British were, however, asked not to 
mention American approval of their Declaration.
166
 What affected this urgency in making a pro-
Zionist statement was a belief by Balfour and the Foreign Office that Germany itself was close to 
capturing Zionism.
167
 Weizmann and pro-Zionist papers in Britain actively reported on German 
designs. Weizmann sent to the Foreign Office a translation of the German newspaper Reichsbote 
which warned the German government about British plans for a “Jewish Republic upon Palestine 
soil” that provided a good railway connection to India and an encirclement and isolation of the 
Central Powers.
168
 Germany had to prevent this by supporting “a Jewish State strictly dependent 
upon Turkish supremacy,” although with an opportunity of developing a national life. The paper 
argued this would bring productive citizens to the Ottoman Empire and strengthen it 
economically.
169
 No less significant were writings by the British-based newspapers, like 
London’s Jewish Chronicle which emphasized Germany’s awareness of “general political 
importance of a Jewish revival in Palestine.”
170
 
Ultimately, the Balfour Declaration was adopted at the Cabinet meeting of 31 October 
1917. It was not, however, without opposition, mainly from the Secretary of State for India 
Edwin Montagu and Lord Curzon. Montagu was an assimilated British Jew and an ardent 
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opponent of Zionism. He denied the existence of a secular Jewish nation and believed Zionism 
was a “mischievous political creed”. Montagu questioned British support of it, wondering 
whether it implied that Muslims and Christians of Palestine were to make way for Jews who 
would be put in positions of preference.
171
 Furthermore, he feared that creating a national home 
for Jews would imply Jews living elsewhere would become foreigners.
172
 To Lord Curzon, the 
former Viceroy of India, any pro-Zionist policy was questionable for practical reasons. The 
country was small and deprived of resources, and the Jews were less than a quarter of the 
population. If it was to be carried out, he recommended establishing European rather than Jewish 
administration of the country, and most importantly, securing religious sites for Muslims, 
Christians, and Jews equally.
173
 Curzon realized that most Zionist settlers would come from 
Europe, be strangers in the Middle East and thus depend on Britain. He was skeptical about 
romantic visions of Palestine but did not block the policy. Nonetheless, he urged colleagues not 
to raise false expectations, while conceding that expressions of pro-Zionist sympathy added 
valuably to British propaganda.
174
 
Lloyd George’s patronage of Zionism was in some ways a continuation of Britain’s 
nineteenth century association with Palestine. Like Palmerston, he was interested in the fate of 
the Jewish people. Lloyd George combined Christian Zionism, propaganda, and also geopolitics. 
He understood the strategic value of Palestine for the safety of Egypt. His cabinet stressed the 
“importance of securing the future safety of the British Empire by removing the menace, 
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which…the German ambition for expansion towards the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf created 
to the sea communications of the Empire, and to its peaceful development.”
175
 It was thus 
desirable to retain territories such as Palestine and Mesopotamia. However, the Prime Minister 
was aware of changing circumstances in the world. For one, Britain became financially 
dependent on U.S. loans.
176
 Second, President Wilson was an anti-imperialist. While Lloyd 
George was interested in partition of the Ottoman Empire, in the long run, he wanted to secure 
British interests through indirect rule. British imperialism of this period showed a continuity with 
overall patterns of British imperialism in the twentieth century where the security of Suez 
remained a prime concern. Acquisitions were necessary, but it was wise to put them in 
perspective: “[when] the war began, there was no idea in the minds of the British public, or of 
the British Government, of acquiring foreign territory. A succession of British statesmen had 
pronounced that our Empire was large enough.”
177
 Blame was placed on aggressive 
pronouncements and policies by German leaders, academics and journalists who were bent on 
building an empire that threatened others. More importantly, Germany infected Turkey with 
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 So, captured territories like Palestine had to be kept by Britain for defensive 
reasons in this case, because it was the military gate to the Suez Canal. In Turkish and German 
hands, however, it would be a “sally port from which an attack might be made…upon [the] Sinai 
Peninsula and the valley of the Nile.”
179
 
However, Lloyd George understood that British claims of ruling interest over acquired 
territories could be bolstered by favorable dealings with minorities. For instance, the Jews in 
Palestine could help get territory claimed also by France.
180
 Sykes believed such associations 
could reinforce British legitimacy: “what we may not be able to get by force of arms we may 
well get the substance of by negotiation if the national elements are on our side at the 
Conference.”
181
 This was where Dr. Weizmann came in. He disliked internationalization 
schemes or dual-administration with the French, as he viewed them as atheists at home and 
exporters of aggressive Catholicism abroad.
182
 By contrast, a British protectorate in Palestine 
was backed by American Zionists
183
 and perceived by British Jewry as a possibility for “normal 
development of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.”
184
 This was what Lloyd George sought as 
well. Interestingly however, there was an idea of involving the United States and entrusting it 
with a trusteeship in Palestine. This was expected to improve relations with the Americans in the 
post-war period, and allow Britain to validate its own trusteeships elsewhere in the Middle 
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 London would not be accused of land-grabbing, and would demonstrate how responsible 
administration was different from annexation. Thirdly, in Lord Milner’s view, Britain would get 
the United States to take a part in carrying the white man’s burden.
186
 Yet, in the end, Lloyd 
George decided Britain would stay in Palestine and Mesopotamia. British interests in Egypt, 
Arabia and Mesopotamia were too complex, and placing a “new and crude Power” which would 
be tempted to hear complaints against the British by Arabs and then pressure Britain into 
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Conclusion: The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine 
The Balfour Declaration combined many elements of a century-long relationship between the 
British political establishment and the question of Jews. Just as in Palmerston’s time, support for 
Zionism in 1917-1922 was in part driven by strategic considerations. Britain had to secure its 
geopolitical objectives in the Middle East, while adapting its policy to what was politically 
acceptable and financially sustainable. British imperialism thus sought a form of indirect rule 
through patronizing local populations. In case of Palestine, the intent was to construct a new 
settler presence. There was also accompanying philo-semitism and humanitarianism on part of 
Lloyd George, Balfour and others. While the Declaration was a milestone in the British-Jewish 
relations, the determination to see it implemented into the mandate for Palestine was of even 
greater significance, because it institutionalized British support for Zionism.  
At the end of the First World War, security of empire was a priority. The empire 
expanded into former enemy territories in the Middle East, consolidating maritime, air and land 
links to the Indian Ocean basin. Palestine remained a vital, despite France’s attempts to dispute 
Britain’s presence. Leo Amery claimed that “strategically Palestine and Egypt [went] together.” 
Palestine covered the Suez Canal and its defense, centered upon Kantara. The key for British 
interest in the post-Ottoman Middle East was to “have control of a land through route from 
Egypt and the Mediterranean to Baghdad, both for rapidity of mutual support and in case of the 
danger of submarines in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean.”
188
 The British General Staff 
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shared these views: Syria was vital only if a foreign power occupied Anatolia and Armenia. 
Palestine, however, had to be secured.
189
 
Yet, even after Britain conquered Palestine, its realization of the promise given to the 
Zionists was not well-defined. This created certain difficulties. It gave credence to views of the 
Balfour Declaration as a mere propaganda tool rather than a committed policy.
190
 Indeed, there 
was no agreement on the meaning of “national home”. At the Cabinet meeting which approved 
the Balfour Declaration in October 1917, “national home” was believed to refer to “some form of 
British, American, or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to 
work out their salvation, and to build up…a real centre of national culture.”
191
 It was not 
supposed to imply establishment of an independent Jewish State. Such a state would be a subject 
to “laws of political evolution”. In fact, at the end of the war, there were no specific discussions 
or plans on how the pledge to Jews would be fulfilled. At the time, the main objectives were to 
secure Palestine for Britain and avoid unsettling the Arab majority.
192
 Some in the Cabinet, like 
Milner, believed a separate peace with Ottomans was acceptable, even at the price of keeping 
Palestine under titular Turkish rule: “[the] time has come when we must rely upon diplomacy as 
well as upon arms in order to detach Turkey.”
193
 In November 1917, it seemed such an 
opportunity appeared when British consulate in Athens received news that Ottomans wanted to 
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talk about the exchange of prisoners, and also discuss a separate peace.
194
 Britain and its allies 
would get a free passage through the straits, but would need to financially assist the Ottomans, 
and allow them to keep Asia Minor with Constantinople, and also retain nominal rule over Syria, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia.
195
 There was a strong opposition to such plans. Curzon observed 
how Britain’s other commitments, like the one to Zionists, precluded even nominal concession to 
the Ottomans.
196
 On the other hand, the Chief of General Staff Robertson believed Ottoman 
leaders depended too much on Germany, and couldn’t afford to leave the war on their own, even 
if the offer was genuine.
197
 A meeting did take place in Zurich, but the initiative did not succeed, 
mainly because the Bolsheviks offered an armistice to the Ottomans in early December 1917, 
thus encouraging them to stay in the war.
198
 The interest in a separate peace with the Ottomans 
indicated a continued interest in creation of a buffer zone between British spheres of influence 
and its rivals’ dominions in the Middle East. 
Another difficulty that arose from an ill-defined pro-Zionist policy was that it allowed 
imperial agents in Cairo to promote divergent visions, not only unfamiliar with pledges to 
Zionism, but hostile to them. Some higher officers in Allenby’s army knew nothing about the 
Balfour Declaration or the sympathy of their political leaders for the cause.
199
 A post-war 
Foreign Office memorandum referred to Brigadier-General Gilbert Clayton’s warnings against 
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offending the Muslims and recommendations for an alliance with the Hashemites.
200
 No mention 
was made of Zionism. The British army in Palestine in late in 1917 formed the so called 
O.E.T.A. or “Occupied Enemy Territory Administration”. General Edmund Allenby was 
Commander-in-Chief and was assisted by his Chief Political Officer Brigadier-General Clayton, 
and Ronald Storrs, as District Commissioner of Jerusalem. Clayton and his colleagues felt they 
had a commitment to an Anglo-Arab alliance which they had sponsored throughout the war.
201
 
Their side of the argument was reinforced by finding of the Inter-Allied Commission to the Near 
East led by Americans Henry King and Charles Crane. The Commission was tasked by President 
Wilson to determine the wishes of the local populations concerning their political future.
202
 In 
case of Palestine, they discovered how the realization of Zionist program would be contrary to 
the wishes of the nine-tenths of total population, and thus a serious modification of the program 
was recommended.
203
 The King-Crane Commission proposed adding Palestine to the unitary 
Syrian state under Feisal.
204
 However, Britain and France ignored these recommendations. 
Allenby urged Curzon, who in 1919 succeeded Balfour as the Foreign Secretary, for the Allies to 
recognize Feisal’s state sovereignty, over Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. This would 
preclude conflict with the Arabs, and also establish British and French administration in selected 
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 Curzon refused, arguing this would advance Feisal’s authority over that of the 
Peace Conference, and that Feisal, rather than the League of Nations, would determine mandates 
for the Allied powers.
206
  
Meanwhile, O.E.T.A. sent numerous warnings to London about agitation and possible 
riots by Palestine’s non-Jews and urging modification of the policy. Clayton noted the rising fear 
of Zionism, which spread not only among Muslims, but also Christians in Palestine. Arabs once 
viewed the British as dominant in the region, but suddenly believed Britain “[had] one hand tied 
by her agreement with France, and other by declaration to Zionists.”
207
 This gave rise to an Arab 
party seeking complete independence, which was attractive not only to the youth, but to 
extremists as well.
208
 Clayton suggested publication of the Zionist proposal,
209
 which while 
highlighting Jewish historic claims to Palestine and to a National Home there,
210
 reassured the 
non-Jews their established rights would be upheld, discrimination banned, and fullest religious 
freedom promoted. Overall, it was hoped such a proposal would alleviate concerns of a Zionist 
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take-over. Clayton favored a slow, constructive approach which considered the feelings of the 
non-Jews, and allowed the British policy to evolve over time in respect of all parties.
211
 
Others, like the Chief Military Administrator Major-General Louis Bols, did not conceal 
their animosity towards Zionism. Bols complained about the Zionist Commission, which he 
perceived as “an administration within an administration”. The War Cabinet sent the Zionist 
Commission to Palestine in early 1918 to evaluate the local implications of the Balfour 
Declaration, and to put into practice the assurances given to the Zionists in the Balfour 
Declaration.
212
 In addition, it would serve as the link between Palestine’s Jews and the 
O.E.T.A.
213
 However, to General Bols the work of such a body was a problem given that he 
believed Jews only listened to their Commission, distrusted the military, and “[sought] not 
justice from the Military Occupant but that in every question in which a Jew [was] interested 
discrimination in his favour [should] be shown.”
214
 Bols also refused to publish a declaration 
which would “show Zionism in its true light, and dispel, not only amongst the native classes, but 
also amongst the Europeans, the very erroneous and harmful appreciation of the policy of 
H.M.G.”
215
 Instead he openly advocated Feisal’s rule over Palestine.
216
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One Zionist ally at O.E.T.A. was Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen who assisted 
Weizmann often contrarily to his superiors.
217
 He deemed the Military Administration in 
Palestine as suitable only for temporary tasks and not for long-term assignments given that “its 
creed is stagnation.”
218
 Meinertzhagen attributed some unrest among the Arabs to the lack of a 
final settlement with the Turks and French mishandling of Syria. In the end, however, O.E.T.A.’s 
undoing came after the April 1920 riots in Jerusalem during the Nebi Musa religious festival. 
Over two hundred people were injured while several were left dead, mostly Jews, and 
Meintertzhagen described the event as a “pogrom”. His harsh criticism of the military 
administration’s anti-Semitic attitudes
219
 reached Lloyd George and Curzon who were at the time 
in San Remo Conference. There at the meeting of victorious Allies, the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary secured British gains in the Middle East, and warded off attempts by French 
Premier Alexandre Millerand to undermine Britain’s mandate by introducing elements of the 
dual-rule in Palestine, such as the Inter-Allied Commission composed of representatives of 
interested religious bodies.
220
 After hearing Meinertzhagen’s complaints, they did not wait for an 
official inquiry into the riots, and decided at once, against Allenby’s advice,
221
 to appoint a 
civilian administration under Herbert Samuel. 
It is important to note that Curzon was wary about further pledges to the Zionists. He 
believed: “the only safe plan was to repeat the pledge in the precise form in which it had been 
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 When Weizmann campaigned to include recognition of the supposed 
historic rights of the Jews to Palestine, Curzon objected noting “if you word it like that, I can see 
Weizmann coming to me every other day and saying he has a right to do this, that or the other in 
Palestine!”
223
 He feared further proclamations could cost Britain the support from Palestine’s 
Arab majority.
224
 Nonetheless, Curzon remained loyal to the policy stated in the Balfour 
Declaration.
225
 He and Lloyd George deemed the security of the Suez Canal vital and disliked 
the idea of leaving the mandate for Palestine to other foreign powers.
226
 Despite O.E.T.A., the 
pledge to Zionism was a serious commitment, which they saw as a justification for Britain’s right 
to administer Palestine.
227
 Curzon confirmed that the proposed terms of the mandate would 
incorporate the Balfour Declaration, and it was a “chose jugée”, which the Arab delegation to the 
peace conference had to accept, albeit reassured they would not be subjected to minority rule.
228
 
Britain’s ultimate policy in the Middle East was defined by Winston Churchill, who 
succeeded Milner as Colonial Secretary in January 1921.
229
 Churchill had two objectives: reduce 
the costs of administering the Middle East and expand role of his office. He propagated a model 
of an empire on the cheap, secured by the Royal Air Force and use of local troops.
230
 Besides, to 
augment the role of the Colonial Office, he annexed resources and responsibilities from other 
departments, like Curzon’s Foreign Office, and wanted to have a dominant say on all of 
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 At the Cairo Conference in March 1921 he set out his vision for the Middle East. He 
was able to settle affairs with the Hashemites by recognizing Feisal’s rule in Iraq and Abdullah’s 
in Trans-Jordan, thus preventing the latter from making war on France.
232
 Churchill emphasized 
the delicacy of Abdullah’s position in Jordan and a need to give “a very free hand.”
233
 Lloyd 
George worried France would view surrounding Syria with Hashemites in Iraq and Trans-Jordan 
as a deliberate British plot.
234
 Churchill, however, emphasized the area was given to Britain as an 
international obligation, and the steps undertaken were required to fulfill this duty, preserve 
order and prevent French intrusion.
235
 He believed supporting Abdullah in Trans-Jordan would 
cost little and would prevent costly entanglements,
236
 and asserted the latter “has definitely 
undertaken to be our friend.”
237
 While the Zionists were disappointed by detachment of Jordan 
from Palestine, Churchill supported them by telling Palestinian Arab delegates how he couldn’t 
repudiate the Balfour Declaration even if he wanted to.
238
 He emphasized it was the basis upon 
which Britain would discharge its mandate.
239
 He tried to allay their concerns by reiterating 
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Britain would not allow “expropriation of one set of people by another or the violent trampling 
down of one set of national ideals for the sake of erecting another.”
240
 
Churchill sympathized with Zionism. While speaking at the site of the future Hebrew 
University in March 1921 he stated how his ‘heart [was] full of sympathy for Zionism’, and how 
he had been a sympathizer for over twelve years.
241
 He thought that the establishment of a 
Jewish National Home in Palestine would be a blessing to the whole world. Nonetheless he was 
also pragmatic and defended his officials. After the Jaffa riots in May 1921, Samuel 
recommended limits on the immigration by allowing in only those Jews who had ready 
employment.
242
 His actions outraged many Zionists, and Parliamentary pro-Zionists like Colonel 
Wedgwood who questioned the imposition of immigration limits on an educated and 
hardworking European proletariat.
243
 Churchill, however, backed the High Commissioner. He 
still sought a compromise with the Arabs urging in them in November 1921 to join a proposed 
legislative assembly, but they rejected the idea.
244
 The British Government remained steadfast. 
They could withdraw from it, refer the mandate back to the League of Nations and see the 
development of an Arab government in Palestine, but it would compromise the Government’s 
prestige.
245
 Churchill emphasized the cost of such a choice: “we cannot possible agree to allow 
the Jewish colonies to be wrecked, or all future immigration to be stopped, without definitely 
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accepting the position that the word of Britain no longer counts throughout…the Middle East.”
246
 
Nonetheless, in his 1922 White Paper he recognized the reality of determined Arab opposition. 
Limits were put on the immigration which “[could not] be so great in volume as to exceed 
whatever [might] be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals.”
247
 
In the end, despite misgivings by ministers like Curzon or members of the military like 
Allenby and Clayton who believed support for Zionism undermined other gains in the Middle 
East, Britain entrenched itself behind the Jewish Nation Home, which was approved by the 
League of the Nations on 22 July 1922.
248
 The long-established strategic priorities for safety of 
the Suez Canal influenced British policy from the start of the war, and they remained vital after 
it. The Balfour Declaration combined elements of wartime strategy, propaganda and 
humanitarianism, and it remained a tool which allowed Lloyd George and his colleagues to 
secure the mandate at San Remo Conference in 1920.  It was not a hasty wartime measure, but 
rather an ultimate expression of Britain’s geopolitical and humanitarian interest in Palestine. It 
was, nonetheless, remarkable how very few of the challenges facing realization of the pledge 
contained in the Balfour Declaration in 1918-1922 were foreseen by the statesmen who backed it 
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